18th century in literature - Wikipedia
Matthew White traces the Enlightenment back to its roots in the aftermath of The Enlightenment – the great 'Age of Reason' – is defined as the with developments in industry and politics, witnessed the emergence of the 'modern world'. Cavendish's ground-breaking proto-novel wove original scientific. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress . individuals spread across one hundred years of European history. It seems, then . mining the practical relationship between the intellectual elite of the . the revolt of democratic Christianity and the rise of public opinion') illustrates. The age of Enlightenment is considered to have ended with the French Revolution, . meaning of a particular book or text such as the Bible was open to deeper exploration It modified the medieval view of the world and human beings' relation to it. . But with the rise of postmodernism, which is one of the.
Critiques of the Enlightenment Critiques from Hume and Kant In spite of its great contributions to the awareness of human dignity and the development of science, the Enlightenment apparently had its own limitations. So, from within the tradition of the Enlightenment, there emerged some notable critiques of the Enlightenment, such as Hume 's skepticism and Kant 's critical philosophy.
Hume's thoroughgoing empiricism resulted in his skepticism about causality, thus destroying the rationalistic approach to God and the world. Kant decided that while pure reason may know the phenomenal world of causation, it cannot know Godfreedomand afterlifewhich can only be postulated through faith in the moral sense of duty.
This way, the claim of reason to sole validity in the Enlightenment started to decline. Political conservatism The French Revolution was a political outcome of the Enlightenment. So, its violent extremes particularly during the Reign of Terror fueled a major reaction against the Enlightenment, which many writers blamed for undermining traditional beliefs that sustained the ancien regime, thereby fomenting revolution.
Counter-revolutionary conservatives such as Irish politician Edmund BurkeFrench Jesuit Augustin Barrueland French writer Joseph de Maistre all asserted a close link between the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, as did many of the revolutionary leaders themselves, so that the Enlightenment became increasingly discredited as the French Revolution became increasingly bloody.
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France was heavily spiced with hostile references to the revolutionaries as merely politicized philosophes. Barruel argued, in his best-selling Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinismone of the most widely read books of its period, that the French Revolution was the consequence of a conspiracy of philosophes and freemasons.
De Maistre saw the crimes of the Reign of Terror as the apotheosis and the logical consequence of the destructive spirit of the eighteenth century, as well as the divinely decreed punishment for it.
This reaction to the French Revolution did not necessarily extend to its American counterpart. Burke, for one, was entirely supportive of the American Revolutionwhose values he saw as compatible with traditions in their best sense. Religious conservatism Traditionalism in France The political Counter-revolution had its counterpart in a religious reaction to its Enlightenment values, especially in France. Joseph de Maistre, mentioned above as a political counter-revolutionary, was also a staunch defender of the Papacy; in he wrote Du Pape On the Pope in which he argued for the infallible authority of the Pope to bring political stability in Europe.
German fideism With the long tradition of Lutheranism and Pietism in Germany, a fideist reaction against the Enlightenment emerged there. Johann Georg Hamann maintained that reason is limited when people try to understand themselves and all existence, and that this limitation of reason leads them to feel that they are ignorant.
Consciousness of ignorance leads to genuine faith. Another German fideist was Friedrich Heinrich Jacobiwho believed that super sensible realities such as God can be perceived by an intuitive feeling or faith, as distinguished from scientific reason. Romanticism and the Counter-Enlightemment Rousseau 's romantic sentimental longing for nature was an influence for the emergence of a new movement called Romanticism around the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, as an another reaction against the Enlightenment.
It was especially in Germany that this movement, with its emphasis upon imagination, spontaneity, and passion, flourished in the fields such as literature and art.
Graeme Garrard identifies Rousseau as the father of the Counter-Enlightenment,  and even broadens the meaning of the term "Counter-Enlightenment," by saying that there have been many Counter-Enlightenments from the middle of the eighteenth century to the twentieth century amongst various critics, both conservative and liberal alike, including postmodernists and feminists.
But with the rise of postmodernism, which is one of the Counter-Enlightenments according to Garrard, the features of the Enlightenment started to be regarded as liabilities—excessive specialization, failure to heed traditional wisdom or provide for unintended consequences, and the excessive admiration of Enlightenment figures such as the Founding Fathers of the United States.
They prompted a backlash against both science- and Enlightenment-based dogma in general. Postmodern philosophers such as Michel Foucault are often understood as arguing that the Age of Reason unfairly constructed a vision of unreason as being demonic and subhuman, and therefore, evil and befouling.
He saw truth as more subjective and all disciplines as created by elites who control the academy, who determine, often based on self-interests, the standards of normality. Once one method has been selected over others, alternatives become deviant.
What does not conform is heresy. History, for example, is written by winners not losers, usually by men not women, by the elite not the workers. Foucault actually draws some of his ideas from the Freudo-Marxist book written by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno of the Frankfurt School, Dialectic of Enlightenment, which was a penetrating critique of what they perceived as the contradiction of Enlightenment thought: Enlightenment is at once liberatory and, through the domination of instrumental rationality, tending towards totalitarianism, such as fascism, in the twentieth century.
Nasr expresses Muslim criticism of the Enlightenment as separating knowledge from value. Western science and technology, he says, is immoral because there is no concern with the consequences of progress, but focus only with progress itself.
Science no longer serves humanity, but its own quest for yet more knowledge. His basic critique is that reason became detached from "revelation," and thus also from values. Nasr castigates contemporary Islamic fundamentalists for claiming that when they borrow Western technology that are retrieving what Islam gave Europe through Spain.
Nasr argues that the West condemns as heretics the very philosophers from which they borrowed, while Western science also stands on a foundation which they reject, that is, the primary of reason over revelation.
There are also Christians who likewise have criticized the Enlightenment. Critical acceptance At the end of the eighteenth century, Christian thinkers such as Kant and Friedrich Schleiermacher were actually appreciative of the Enlightenment, but at the same time, they were of Pietistic background.
They were deeply aware of the tension of their Pietistic faith tradition with the humanism of the Enlightenment. So, they attempted to critically accept Enlightenment thought, by synthesizing both traditions. Kant came up with a religion of "practical reason" not of "pure reason" as a new synthesis of the two, while Schleiermacher decided that "feeling" not "pure reason" nor "practical reason" is the domain of synthesis.
Their projects of synthesis set the tone of nineteenth century Christian theology. Today, many conservative and evangelical Christians see the Enlightenment tradition as a continued challenge to their faith. The tension of the two traditions still seems to continuously exist today. So, in the twentieth century Reinhold Niebuhr called for "a new synthesis" of both traditions and Paul Tillich for "new ways of mediation. Glenz, and Alister McGrath have been open to dialogue with the Enlightenment tradition.
Crown, ; James Buchan, Crowded with Genius: Edinburgh's Moment of the Mind New York: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present Routledge, Edmund Jephcott Stanford University Press, Human Destiny New York: Simon and Schuster, An Anthology of Essays. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Columbia University Press, British Philosophy in the Age of Enlightenment.
Edinburgh's Moment of the Mind. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment.
Princeton University Press, A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. From the Eighteenth Century to the Present.
Enlightenment Orientalism: Resisting the Rise of the Novel, Aravamudan
A Republican Critique of the Philosophes. State University of New York Press, How the Scots Invented the Modern World: Faith in the Age of Reason. The Roads to Modernity: The British, French, and American Enlightenments. Distributed by Random House, Dialectic of Enlightenment Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford University Press, Rousseau and the Philosophes.
Harvard University Press, A Brief History with Documents. Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment. Oxford University Press, Yale University Press, The Enlightenment in America. Protestant Thought Before Kant. A Comparative Social History Traditional Islam in the Modern World.
Foolishness to the Greeks. The Nature and Destiny of Man. Charles Scribner's Sons, A History of Christian Thought. The skeptical cast of mind is one prominent manifestation of the Enlightenment spirit. The influence of Pierre Bayle, another founding figure of the Enlightenment, testifies to this.
Bayle was a French Protestant, who, like many European philosophers of his time, was forced to live and work in politically liberal and tolerant Holland in order to avoid censorship and prison. The form of the book is intimidating: Rarely has a work with such intimidating scholarly pretentions exerted such radical and liberating influence in the culture.
It exerts this influence through its skeptical questioning of religious, metaphysical, and scientific dogmas. It is the attitude of inquiry that Bayle displays, rather than any doctrine he espouses, that mark his as distinctively Enlightenment thought. He is fearless and presumptuous in questioning all manner of dogma. While it is common to conceive of the Enlightenment as supplanting the authority of tradition and religious dogma with the authority of reason, in fact the Enlightenment is characterized by a crisis of authority regarding any belief.
Hume articulates a variety of skepticisms. Hume also articulates skepticism with regard to reason in an argument that is anticipated by Bayle. Hume begins this argument by noting that, though rules or principles in demonstrative sciences are certain or infallible, given the fallibility of our faculties, our applications of such rules or principles in demonstrative inferences yield conclusions that cannot be regarded as certain or infallible.
On reflection, our conviction in the conclusions of demonstrative reasoning must be qualified by an assessment of the likelihood that we made a mistake in our reasoning. Hume also famously questions the justification of inductive reasoning and causal reasoning. Hume concludes that we have no rational justification for our causal or inductive judgments. The Enlightenment begins by unleashing skepticism in attacking limited, circumscribed targets, but once the skeptical genie is out of the bottle, it becomes difficult to maintain conviction in any authority.
Thus, the despairing attitude that Hume famously expresses in the conclusion to Book One of the Treatise, as the consequence of his epistemological inquiry, while it clashes with the self-confident and optimistic attitude we associate with the Enlightenment, in fact reflects an essential possibility in a distinctive Enlightenment problematic regarding authority in belief. The enthusiasm for the scientific study of humanity in the period incorporates a tension or paradox concerning the place of humanity in the cosmos, as the cosmos is re-conceived in the context of Enlightenment philosophy and science.
But if our conception of nature is of an exclusively material domain governed by deterministic, mechanical laws, and if we at the same time deny the place of the supernatural in the cosmos, then how does humanity itself fit into the cosmos? On the one hand, the achievements of the natural sciences in general are the great pride of the Enlightenment, manifesting the excellence of distinctively human capacities.
On the other hand, the study of humanity in the Enlightenment typically yields a portrait of us that is the opposite of flattering or elevating. Instead of being represented as occupying a privileged place in nature, as made in the image of God, humanity is represented typically in the Enlightenment as a fully natural creature, devoid of free will, of an immortal soul, and of a non-natural faculty of intelligence or reason.
The very title of J. The methodology of epistemology in the period reflects a similar tension. As noted, Hume means his work to comprise a science of the mind or of man. Immanuel Kant explicitly enacts a revolution in epistemology modeled on the Copernican in astronomy. As characteristic of Enlightenment epistemology, Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reasonsecond edition undertakes both to determine the limits of our knowledge, and at the same time to provide a foundation of scientific knowledge of nature, and he attempts to do this by examining our human faculties of knowledge critically.
Even as he draws strict limits to rational knowledge, he attempts to defend reason as a faculty of knowledge, as playing a necessary role in natural science, in the face of skeptical challenges that reason faces in the period. According to Kant, scientific knowledge of nature is not merely knowledge of what in fact happens in nature, but knowledge of the causal laws of nature according to which what in fact happens must happen.
But how is knowledge of necessary causal connection in nature possible? The generalized epistemological problem Kant addresses in the Critique of Pure Reason is: Put in the terms Kant defines, the problem is: Certain cognitive forms lie ready in the human mind — prominent examples are the pure concepts of substance and cause and the forms of intuition, space and time; given sensible representations must conform themselves to these forms in order for human experience as empirical knowledge of nature to be possible at all.
We can acquire scientific knowledge of nature because we constitute it a priori according to certain cognitive forms; for example, we can know nature as a causally ordered domain because we originally synthesize a priori the given manifold of sensibility according to the category of causality, which has its source in the human mind.
Kant saves rational knowledge of nature by limiting rational knowledge to nature. Through the postulation of a realm of unknowable noumena things in themselves over against the realm of nature as a realm of appearances, Kant manages to make place for practical concepts that are central to our understanding of ourselves even while grounding our scientific knowledge of nature as a domain governed by deterministic causal laws.
Many of the human and social sciences have their origins in the eighteenth century e. The emergence of new sciences is aided by the development of new scientific tools, such as models for probabilistic reasoning, a kind of reasoning that gains new respect and application in the period. Despite the multiplication of sciences in the period, the ideal remains to comprehend the diversity of our scientific knowledge as a unified system of science; however, this ideal of unity is generally taken as regulative, as an ideal to emerge in the ever-receding end-state of science, rather than as enforced from the beginning by regimenting science under a priori principles.
As exemplifying these and other tendencies of the Enlightenment, one work deserves special mention: The work aims to provide a compendium of existing human knowledge to be transmitted to subsequent generations, a transmission intended to contribute to the progress and dissemination of human knowledge and to a positive transformation of human society. The orientation of the Encyclopedia is decidedly secular and implicitly anti-authoritarian.
The collaborative nature of the project, especially in the context of state opposition, contributes significantly to the formation of a shared sense of purpose among the wide variety of intellectuals who belong to the French Enlightenment. It is a striking feature of the Encyclopedia, and one by virtue of which it exemplifies the Baconian conception of science characteristic of the period, that its entries cover the whole range and scope of knowledge, from the most abstract theoretical to the most practical, mechanical and technical.
The era is marked by three political revolutions, which together lay the basis for modern, republican, constitutional democracies: Enlightenment philosophers find that the existing social and political orders do not withstand critical scrutiny. Existing political and social authority is shrouded in religious myth and mystery and founded on obscure traditions.
The criticism of existing institutions is supplemented with the positive work of constructing in theory the model of institutions as they ought to be.Development of the English Novel (17th and 18th Centuries & Development of the English Novel Part 2)
We owe to this period the basic model of government founded upon the consent of the governed; the articulation of the political ideals of freedom and equality and the theory of their institutional realization; the articulation of a list of basic individual human rights to be respected and realized by any legitimate political system; the articulation and promotion of toleration of religious diversity as a virtue to be respected in a well ordered society; the conception of the basic political powers as organized in a system of checks and balances; and other now-familiar features of western democracies.
However, for all the enduring accomplishments of Enlightenment political philosophy, it is not clear that human reason proves powerful enough to put a concrete, positive authoritative ideal in place of the objects of its criticism. As in the epistemological domain, reason shows its power more convincingly in criticizing authorities than in establishing them.
Here too the question of the limits of reason is one of the main philosophical legacies of the period. These limits are arguably vividly illustrated by the course of the French Revolution. The explicit ideals of the French Revolution are the Enlightenment ideals of individual freedom and equality; but, as the revolutionaries attempt to devise rational, secular institutions to put in place of those they have violently overthrown, eventually they have recourse to violence and terror in order to control and govern the people.
The devolution of the French Revolution into the Reign of Terror is perceived by many as proving the emptiness and hypocrisy of Enlightenment reason, and is one of the main factors which account for the end of the Enlightenment as an historical period.
The political revolutions of the Enlightenment, especially the French and the American, were informed and guided to a significant extent by prior political philosophy in the period. Though Thomas Hobbes, in his Leviathandefends the absolute power of the political sovereign, and is to that extent opposed to the revolutionaries and reformers in England, this work is a founding work of Enlightenment political theory.
According to the general social contract model, political authority is grounded in an agreement often understood as ideal, rather than real among individuals, each of whom aims in this agreement to advance his rational self-interest by establishing a common political authority over all.
Thus, according to the general contract model though this is more clear in later contract theorists such as Locke and Rousseau than in Hobbes himselfpolitical authority is grounded not in conquest, natural or divinely instituted hierarchy, or in obscure myths and traditions, but rather in the rational consent of the governed. In initiating this model, Hobbes takes a naturalistic, scientific approach to the question of how political society ought to be organized against the background of a clear-eyed, unsentimental conception of human natureand thus decisively influences the Enlightenment process of secularization and rationalization in political and social philosophy.
Baruch Spinoza also greatly contributes to the development of Enlightenment political philosophy in its early years. The metaphysical doctrines of the Ethics lay the groundwork for his influence on the age. In his main political work, Tractatus Theologico-PoliticusSpinoza, building on his rationalist naturalism, opposes superstition, argues for toleration and the subordination of religion to the state, and pronounces in favor of qualified democracy.
18th century in literature
Liberalism is perhaps the most characteristic political philosophy of the Enlightenment, and Spinoza, in this text primarily, is one of its originators. Filmer defends the right of kings to exercise absolute authority over their subjects on the basis of the claim that they inherit the authority God vested in Adam at creation.
According to Locke, in order to understand the nature and source of legitimate political authority, we have to understand our relations in the state of nature. We also exist naturally in a condition of freedom, insofar as we may do with ourselves and our possessions as we please, within the constraints of the fundamental law of nature.
According to Locke, we rationally quit this natural condition by contracting together to set over ourselves a political authority, charged with promulgating and enforcing a single, clear set of laws, for the sake of guaranteeing our natural rights, liberties and possessions.
The civil, political law, founded ultimately upon the consent of the governed, does not cancel the natural law, according to Locke, but merely serves to draw that law closer.
Consequently, when established political power violates that law, the people are justified in overthrowing it. According to the natural law tradition, as the Enlightenment makes use of it, we can know through the use of our unaided reason that we all — all human beings, universally — stand in particular moral relations to each other.
The claim that we can apprehend through our unaided reason a universal moral order exactly because moral qualities and relations in particular human freedom and equality belong to the nature of things, is attractive in the Enlightenment for obvious reasons.
However, as noted above, the scientific apprehension of nature in the period does not support, and in fact opposes, the claim that the alleged moral qualities and relations or, indeed, that any moral qualities and relations are natural. According to a common Enlightenment assumption, as humankind clarifies the laws of nature through the advance of natural science and philosophy, the true moral and political order will be revealed with it. This view is expressed explicitly by the philosophe Marquis de Condorcet, in his Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind published posthumously in and which, perhaps better than any other work, lays out the paradigmatically Enlightenment view of history of the human race as a continual progress to perfection.
But, in fact, advance in knowledge of the laws of nature in the science of the period does not help with discernment of a natural political or moral order. This asserted relationship between natural scientific knowledge and the political and moral order is under great stress already in the Enlightenment.
With respect to Lockean liberalism, though his assertion of the moral and political claims natural freedom, equality, et cetera continues to have considerable force for us, the grounding of these claims in a religious cosmology does not. The question of how to ground our claims to natural freedom and equality is one of the main philosophical legacies of the Enlightenment. Locke claims that the end or purpose of political society is the preservation and protection of property though he defines property broadly to include not only external property but life and liberties as well.
The civil freedom that Locke defines, as something protected by the force of political laws, comes increasingly to be interpreted as the freedom to trade, to exchange without the interference of governmental regulation. Within the context of the Enlightenment, economic freedom is a salient interpretation of the individual freedom highly valued in the period.
His is one of many voices in the Enlightenment advocating for free trade and for minimal government regulation of markets. The trading house floor, in which people of various nationalities, languages, cultures, religions come together and trade, each in pursuit of his own self-interest, but, through this pursuit, supplying the wants of their respective nations and increasing its wealth, represents for some Enlightenment thinkers the benign, peaceful, universal rational order that they wish to see replace the violent, confessional strife that characterized the then-recent past of Europe.
However, the liberal conception of the government as properly protecting economic freedom of citizens and private property comes into conflict in the Enlightenment with the value of democracy. James Madison confronts this tension in the context of arguing for the adoption of the U. Constitution in his Federalist Madison argues that popular government pure democracy is subject to the evil of factions; in a pure democracy, a majority bound together by a private interest, relative to the whole, has the capacity to impose its particular will on the whole.
Though commitment to the political ideals of freedom and equality constitutes a common ground for Enlightenment political philosophy, it is not clear not only how these values have a home in nature as Enlightenment science re-conceives it, but also how concretely to interpret each of these ideals and how properly to balance them against each other.
Contrary to Madison, Rousseau argues that direct pure democracy is the only form of government in which human freedom can be realized. The contract consists in the self-alienation by each associate of all rights and possessions to the body politic. Because each alienates all, each is an equal member of the body politic, and the terms and conditions are the same for all.
The emergence of factions is avoided insofar as the good of each citizen is, and is understood to be, equally because wholly dependent on the general will. Legislation supports this identification with the general will by preserving the original equality established in the contract, prominently through maintaining a measure of economic equality.
Montesquieu argues that the system of legislation for a people varies appropriately with the particular circumstances of the people. He provides specific analysis of how climate, fertility of the soil, population size, et cetera, affect legislation. He famously distinguishes three main forms of governments: He describes leading characteristics of each. His argument that functional democracies require the population to possess civic virtue in high measure, a virtue that consists in valuing public good above private interest, influences later Enlightenment theorists, including both Rousseau and Madison.
He describes the threat of factions to which Madison and Rousseau respond in different indeed opposite ways. He provides the basic structure and justification for the balance of political powers that Madison later incorporates into the U. A Reader, edited by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze. When Enlightenment thinkers do turn their attention to the social standing of women or of non-white people, they tend to spout unreasoned prejudice.
Moreover, while the philosophies of the Enlightenment generally aspire or pretend to universal truth, unattached to particular time, place or culture, Enlightenment writings are rife with rank ethno- and Eurocentrism, often explicit. In the face of such tensions within the Enlightenment, one response is to affirm the power of the Enlightenment to improve humanity and society long beyond the end of the eighteenth century, indeed, down to the present day and into the future.
This response embraces the Enlightenment and interprets more recent emancipation movements and achievement of recognition of the rights and dignity of traditionally oppressed and marginalized groups as expressions of Enlightenment ideals and aspirations. Critics of the Enlightenment respond differently to such tensions. Critics see them as symptoms of disorder, ideology, perversity, futility or falsehood that afflict the very core of the Enlightenment itself.
As another example, we may point to some post-modern feminists, who argue, in opposition to the liberal feminists who embrace broadly Enlightenment ideals and conceptions, that the essentialism and universalism associated with Enlightenment ideals are both false and intrinsically hostile to the aspirations to self-realization of women and of other traditionally oppressed groups.
See Strickland and the essays in Akkerman and Stuurman. Prior to the Enlightenment in the West, ethical reflection begins from and orients itself around religious doctrines concerning God and the afterlife. The highest good of humanity, and, accordingly, the content and grounding of moral duties, are conceived in immediately religious terms.
During the Enlightenment, this changes, certainly within philosophy, but to some significant degree, within the population of western society at large. As the processes of industrialization, urbanization, and dissemination of education advance in this period, happiness in this life, rather than union with God in the next, becomes the highest end for more and more people.
Also, the violent religious wars that bloody Europe in the early modern period motivate the development of secular, this-worldly ethics, insofar as they indicate the failure of religious doctrines concerning God and the afterlife to establish a stable foundation for ethics. In the Enlightenment, philosophical thinkers confront the problem of developing ethical systems on a secular, broadly naturalistic basis for the first time since the rise of Christianity eclipsed the great classical ethical systems.
However, the changes in our understanding of nature and cosmology, effected by modern natural science, make recourse to the systems of Plato and Aristotle problematic. The Platonic identification of the good with the real and the Aristotelian teleological understanding of natural things are both difficult to square with the Enlightenment conception of nature.
The general philosophical problem emerges in the Enlightenment of how to understand the source and grounding of ethical duties, and how to conceive the highest good for human beings, within a secular, broadly naturalistic context, and within the context of a transformed understanding of the natural world. The basis of human action that Hobbes posits is immediately intelligible and even shared with other animals to some extent; a set of moral duties constructed on this basis would also be intelligible, de-mystified, and fit within the larger scheme of nature.
Samuel Clarke, an influential rationalist British thinker early in the Enlightenment, undertakes to show in his Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religionagainst Hobbes, that the absolute difference between moral good and moral evil lies in the immediately discernible nature of things, independently of any compacts or positive legislation by God or human beings. Likewise for the rest of what morality enjoins upon us.
Rationalist ethics so conceived faces the following obstacles in the Enlightenment. First, as implied above, it becomes increasingly implausible that the objective, mind-independent order is really as rationalist ethicists claim it to be.
Second, even if the objective realm were ordered as the rationalist claims, it remains unclear how this order gives rise on its own, as it were to obligations binding on our wills. David Hume famously exposes the fallacy of deriving a prescriptive statement that one ought to perform some action from a description of how things stand in relation to each other in nature. Alongside the rationalist strand of ethical philosophy in the Enlightenment, there is also a very significant empiricist strand.