The field of environmental ethics concerns human beings' ethical relationship with the natural environment. While numerous philosophers have written on this. However subsequent to natural environment definition of the Cartesian The human- nature relationship within the context of ethics, both the parties and their. their Implications for Environmental Ethics A social scientific survey on visions of human/nature relationships in western Europe shows that the public .. (https ://bestwebdirectory.info).
Is it morally acceptable for farmers in non-industrial countries to practise slash and burn techniques to clear areas for agriculture? Consider a mining company which has performed open pit mining in some previously unspoiled area. Does the company have a moral obligation to restore the landform and surface ecology?
And what is the value of a humanly restored environment compared with the originally natural environment? If that is wrong, is it simply because a sustainable environment is essential to present and future human well-being? These are among the questions investigated by environmental ethics.
Some of them are specific questions faced by individuals in particular circumstances, while others are more global questions faced by groups and communities. Yet others are more abstract questions concerning the value and moral standing of the natural environment and its non-human components. The former is the value of things as means to further some other ends, whereas the latter is the value of things as ends in themselves regardless of whether they are also useful as means to other ends.
For instance, certain fruits have instrumental value for bats who feed on them, since feeding on the fruits is a means to survival for the bats. However, it is not widely agreed that fruits have value as ends in themselves. We can likewise think of a person who teaches others as having instrumental value for those who want to acquire knowledge.
Yet, in addition to any such value, it is normally said that a person, as a person, has intrinsic value, i.
For another example, a certain wild plant may have instrumental value because it provides the ingredients for some medicine or as an aesthetic object for human observers. But if the plant also has some value in itself independently of its prospects for furthering some other ends such as human health, or the pleasure from aesthetic experience, then the plant also has intrinsic value.
Environmental Ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Many traditional western ethical perspectives, however, are anthropocentric or human-centered in that either they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone i. For example, Aristotle Politics, Bk.
Generally, anthropocentric positions find it problematic to articulate what is wrong with the cruel treatment of non-human animals, except to the extent that such treatment may lead to bad consequences for human beings. From this standpoint, cruelty towards non-human animals would be instrumentally, rather than intrinsically, wrong. Likewise, anthropocentrism often recognizes some non-intrinsic wrongness of anthropogenic i. Such destruction might damage the well-being of human beings now and in the future, since our well-being is essentially dependent on a sustainable environment see Passmore ; Bookchin ; Norton et al.
When environmental ethics emerged as a new sub-discipline of philosophy in the early s, it did so by posing a challenge to traditional anthropocentrism. In the first place, it questioned the assumed moral superiority of human beings to members of other species on earth. In the second place, it investigated the possibility of rational arguments for assigning intrinsic value to the natural environment and its non-human contents.
It should be noted, however, that some theorists working in the field see no need to develop new, non-anthropocentric theories. Instead, they advocate what may be called enlightened anthropocentrism or, perhaps more appropriately called, prudential anthropocentrism. Briefly, this is the view that all the moral duties we have towards the environment are derived from our direct duties to its human inhabitants.
Enlightened anthropocentrism, they argue, is sufficient for that practical purpose, and perhaps even more effective in delivering pragmatic outcomes, in terms of policy-making, than non-anthropocentric theories given the theoretical burden on the latter to provide sound arguments for its more radical view that the non-human environment has intrinsic value cf. Nortonde ShalitLight and Katz Furthermore, some prudential anthropocentrists may hold what might be called cynical anthropocentrism, which says that we have a higher-level anthropocentric reason to be non-anthropocentric in our day-to-day thinking.
Suppose that a day-to-day non-anthropocentrist tends to act more benignly towards the non-human environment on which human well-being depends.
This would provide reason for encouraging non-anthropocentric thinking, even to those who find the idea of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value hard to swallow. The position can be structurally compared to some indirect form of consequentialism and may attract parallel critiques see Henry Sidgwick on utilitarianism and esoteric morality, and Bernard Williams on indirect utilitarianism.
The Early Development of Environmental Ethics Although nature was the focus of much nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy, contemporary environmental ethics only emerged as an academic discipline in the s. The questioning and rethinking of the relationship of human beings with the natural environment over the last thirty years reflected an already widespread perception in the s that the late twentieth century faced a human population explosion as well as a serious environmental crisis.
Commercial farming practices aimed at maximizing crop yields and profits, Carson speculates, are capable of impacting simultaneously on environmental and public health. In a much cited essay White on the historical roots of the environmental crisis, historian Lynn White argued that the main strands of Judeo-Christian thinking had encouraged the overexploitation of nature by maintaining the superiority of humans over all other forms of life on earth, and by depicting all of nature as created for the use of humans.
Central to the rationale for his thesis were the works of the Church Fathers and The Bible itself, supporting the anthropocentric perspective that humans are the only things that matter on Earth. Consequently, they may utilize and consume everything else to their advantage without any injustice. For example, Genesis 1: And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: According to White, the Judeo-Christian idea that humans are created in the image of the transcendent supernatural God, who is radically separate from nature, also by extension radically separates humans themselves from nature.
This ideology further opened the way for untrammeled exploitation of nature. Clearly, without technology and science, the environmental extremes to which we are now exposed would probably not be realized.
Nevertheless, White argued that some minority traditions within Christianity e. Around the same time, the Stanford ecologists Paul and Anne Ehrlich warned in The Population Bomb Ehrlich that the growth of human population threatened the viability of planetary life-support systems.
Here, plain to see, was a living, shining planet voyaging through space and shared by all of humanity, a precious vessel vulnerable to pollution and to the overuse of its limited capacities. In a team of researchers at MIT led by Dennis Meadows published the Limits to Growth study, a work that summed up in many ways the emerging concerns of the previous decade and the sense of vulnerability triggered by the view of the earth from space.
In the commentary to the study, the researchers wrote: We affirm finally that any deliberate attempt to reach a rational and enduring state of equilibrium by planned measures, rather than by chance or catastrophe, must ultimately be founded on a basic change of values and goals at individual, national and world levels.
The new field emerged almost simultaneously in three countries—the United States, Australia, and Norway. In the first two of these countries, direction and inspiration largely came from the earlier twentieth century American literature of the environment.
That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, but that land is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethics. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. His views therefore presented a challenge and opportunity for moral theorists: The land ethic sketched by Leopold, attempting to extend our moral concern to cover the natural environment and its non-human contents, was drawn on explicitly by the Australian philosopher Richard Routley later Sylvan.
According to Routley cf. From the human-chauvinistic or absolutely anthropocentric perspective, the last person would do nothing morally wrong, since his or her destructive act in question would not cause any damage to the interest and well-being of humans, who would by then have disappeared. Nevertheless, Routley points out that there is a moral intuition that the imagined last acts would be morally wrong. An explanation for this judgment, he argued, is that those non-human objects in the environment, whose destruction is ensured by the last person or last people, have intrinsic value, a kind of value independent of their usefulness for humans.
From his critique, Routley concluded that the main approaches in traditional western moral thinking were unable to allow the recognition that natural things have intrinsic value, and that the tradition required overhaul of a significant kind. It would be wrong, he maintained, to eliminate a rare butterfly species simply to increase the monetary value of specimens already held by collectors.
Species, Rolston went on to argue, are intrinsically valuable and are usually more valuable than individual specimens, since the loss of a species is a loss of genetic possibilities and the deliberate destruction of a species would show disrespect for the very biological processes which make possible the emergence of individual living things also see RolstonCh Meanwhile, the work of Christopher Stone a professor of law at the University of Southern California had become widely discussed.
Stone proposed that trees and other natural objects should have at least the same standing in law as corporations. This suggestion was inspired by a particular case in which the Sierra Club had mounted a challenge against the permit granted by the U.
Forest Service to Walt Disney Enterprises for surveys preparatory to the development of the Mineral King Valley, which was at the time a relatively remote game refuge, but not designated as a national park or protected wilderness area.
The Disney proposal was to develop a major resort complex serving visitors daily to be accessed by a purpose-built highway through Sequoia National Park. The Sierra Club, as a body with a general concern for wilderness conservation, challenged the development on the grounds that the valley should be kept in its original state for its own sake. Stone reasoned that if trees, forests and mountains could be given standing in law then they could be represented in their own right in the courts by groups such as the Sierra Club.
Moreover, like any other legal person, these natural things could become beneficiaries of compensation if it could be shown that they had suffered compensatable injury through human activity. When the case went to the U. Supreme Court, it was determined by a narrow majority that the Sierra Club did not meet the condition for bringing a case to court, for the Club was unable and unwilling to prove the likelihood of injury to the interest of the Club or its members.
Only items that have interests, Feinberg argued, can be regarded as having legal standing and, likewise, moral standing. For it is interests which are capable of being represented in legal proceedings and moral debates.
This same point would also seem to apply to political debates. Granted that some animals have interests that can be represented in this way, would it also make sense to speak of trees, forests, rivers, barnacles, or termites as having interests of a morally relevant kind?
This issue was hotly contested in the years that followed. Skeptical of the prospects for any radically new ethic, Passmore cautioned that traditions of thought could not be abruptly overhauled. Any change in attitudes to our natural surroundings which stood the chance of widespread acceptance, he argued, would have to resonate and have some continuities with the very tradition which had legitimized our destructive practices.
The confluence of ethical, political and legal debates about the environment, the emergence of philosophies to underpin animal rights activism and the puzzles over whether an environmental ethic would be something new rather than a modification or extension of existing ethical theories were reflected in wider social and political movements.
It is not clear, however, that collectivist or communist countries do any better in terms of their environmental record see Dominick All three shared a passion for the great mountains.
The deep ecologist respects this intrinsic value, taking care, for example, when walking on the mountainside not to cause unnecessary damage to the plants. To make such a separation not only leads to selfishness towards other people, but also induces human selfishness towards nature.
The identity of a living thing is essentially constituted by its relations to other things in the world, especially its ecological relations to other living things. If people conceptualise themselves and the world in relational terms, the deep ecologists argue, then people will take better care of nature and the world in general. The idea is, briefly, that by identifying with nature I can enlarge the boundaries of the self beyond my skin. To respect and to care for my Self is also to respect and to care for the natural environment, which is actually part of me and with which I should identify.
GreyTaylor and Zimmerman It also remains unclear in what sense rivers, mountains and forests can be regarded as possessors of any kind of interests. Biospheric egalitarianism was modified in the s to the weaker claim that the flourishing of both human and non-human life have value in themselves.
The platform was conceived as establishing a middle ground, between underlying philosophical orientations, whether Christian, Buddhist, Daoist, process philosophy, or whatever, and the practical principles for action in specific situations, principles generated from the underlying philosophies.
Thus the deep ecological movement became explicitly pluralist see Brennan ; c. These "relationalist" developments of deep ecology are, however, criticized by some feminist theorists. The idea of nature as part of oneself, one might argue, could justify the continued exploitation of nature instead.
For one is presumably more entitled to treat oneself in whatever ways one likes than to treat another independent agent in whatever ways one likes. Meanwhile, some third-world critics accused deep ecology of being elitist in its attempts to preserve wilderness experiences for only a select group of economically and socio-politically well-off people.
The Indian writer Ramachandra Guhafor instance, depicts the activities of many western-based conservation groups as a new form of cultural imperialism, aimed at securing converts to conservationism cf. Bookchin and Brennan a. Finally, in other critiques, deep ecology is portrayed as having an inconsistent utopian vision see Anker and Witoszek By the mid s, feminist writers had raised the issue of whether patriarchal modes of thinking encouraged not only widespread inferiorizing and colonizing of women, but also of people of colour, animals and nature.
Sheila Collinsfor instance, argued that male-dominated culture or patriarchy is supported by four interlocking pillars: Emphasizing the importance of feminism to the environmental movement and various other liberation movements, some writers, such as Ynestra King a and bargue that the domination of women by men is historically the original form of domination in human society, from which all other hierarchies—of rank, class, and political power—flow.
For instance, human exploitation of nature may be seen as a manifestation and extension of the oppression of women, in that it is the result of associating nature with the female, which had been already inferiorized and oppressed by the male-dominating culture. But within the plurality of feminist positions, other writers, such as Val Plumwoodunderstand the oppression of women as only one of the many parallel forms of oppression sharing and supported by a common ideological structure, in which one party the colonizer, whether male, white or human uses a number of conceptual and rhetorical devices to privilege its interests over that of the other party the colonized: Facilitated by a common structure, seemingly diverse forms of oppression can mutually reinforce each other Warren,Cheneyand Plumwood These patterns of thinking and conceptualizing the world, many feminist theorists argue, also nourish and sustain other forms of chauvinism, including, human-chauvinism i.
Furthermore, under dualism all the first items in these contrasting pairs are assimilated with each other, and all the second items are likewise linked with each other. For example, the male is seen to be associated with the rational, active, creative, Cartesian human mind, and civilized, orderly, transcendent culture; whereas the female is regarded as tied to the emotional, passive, determined animal body, and primitive, disorderly, immanent nature.
These interlocking dualisms are not just descriptive dichotomies, according to the feminists, but involve a prescriptive privileging of one side of the opposed items over the other. Dualism confers superiority to everything on the male side, but inferiority to everything on the female side. The problem with dualistic and hierarchical modes of thinking, however, is not just that that they are epistemically unreliable.
It is not just that the dominating party often falsely sees the dominated party as lacking or possessing the allegedly superior or inferior qualities, or that the dominated party often internalizes false stereotypes of itself given by its oppressors, or that stereotypical thinking often overlooks salient and important differences among individuals.
More important, according to feminist analyses, the very premise of prescriptive dualism—the valuing of attributes of one polarized side and the devaluing of those of the other, the idea that domination and oppression can be justified by appealing to attributes like masculinity, rationality, being civilized or developed, etc.
Feminism represents a radical challenge for environmental thinking, politics, and traditional social ethical perspectives. It promises to link environmental questions with wider social problems concerning various kinds of discrimination and exploitation, and fundamental investigations of human psychology.
However, whether there are conceptual, causal or merely contingent connections among the different forms of oppression and liberation remains a contested issue see Green However, because of the varieties of, and disagreements among, feminist theories, the label may be too wide to be informative and has generally fallen from use. At the root of this alienation, they argue, is a narrow positivist conception of rationality—which sees rationality as an instrument for pursuing progress, power and technological control, and takes observation, measurement and the application of purely quantitative methods to be capable of solving all problems.
Such a positivistic view of science combines determinism with optimism. Natural processes as well as human activities are seen to be predictable and manipulable. Nature and, likewise, human nature is no longer mysterious, uncontrollable, or fearsome.
Instead, it is reduced to an object strictly governed by natural laws, which therefore can be studied, known, and employed to our benefit. By promising limitless knowledge and power, the positivism of science and technology not only removes our fear of nature, the critical theorists argue, but also destroys our sense of awe and wonder towards it.
The progress in knowledge and material well-being may not be a bad thing in itself, where the consumption and control of nature is a necessary part of human life. However, the critical theorists argue that the positivistic disenchantment of natural things and, likewise, of human beings—because they too can be studied and manipulated by science disrupts our relationship with them, encouraging the undesirable attitude that they are nothing more than things to be probed, consumed and dominated.
To remedy such an alienation, the project of Horkheimer and Adorno is to replace the narrow positivistic and instrumentalist model of rationality with a more humanistic one, in which the values of the aesthetic, moral, sensuous and expressive aspects of human life play a central part.
Thus, their aim is not to give up our rational faculties or powers of analysis and logic. Rather, the ambition is to arrive at a dialectical synthesis between Romanticism and Enlightenment, to return to anti-deterministic values of freedom, spontaneity and creativity.
Not only do we stop seeing nature as primarily, or simply, an object of consumption, we are also able to be directly and spontaneously acquainted with nature without interventions from our rational faculties. The re-enchantment of the world through aesthetic experience, he argues, is also at the same time a re-enchantment of human lives and purposes. Ecocritique does not think that it is paradoxical to say, in the name of ecology itself: It remains to be seen, however, whether the radical attempt to purge the concept of nature from eco-critical work meets with success.
On the other hand, the new animists have been much inspired by the serious way in which some indigenous peoples placate and interact with animals, plants and inanimate things through ritual, ceremony and other practices.
According to the new animists, the replacement of traditional animism the view that personalized souls are found in animals, plants, and other material objects by a form of disenchanting positivism directly leads to an anthropocentric perspective, which is accountable for much human destructiveness towards nature.
In a disenchanted world, there is no meaningful order of things or events outside the human domain, and there is no source of sacredness or dread of the sort felt by those who regard the natural world as peopled by divinities or demons Stone When a forest is no longer sacred, there are no spirits to be placated and no mysterious risks associated with clear-felling it.
A disenchanted nature is no longer alive. It commands no respect, reverence or love. It is nothing but a giant machine, to be mastered to serve human purposes. To be bearers of rights, these beings could not, under any circumstances, have their dignity and interest violated, regardless of the overall benefit calculation that eventually can be done on a case of their instrumental usage. The arguments based on sentience surely include all the animals of more complex nervous system, leaving doubts in relation to other categories of animals.
These whose inclusion in moral consideration is questionable or inconclusive, by means of sentience could, in turn, have their interests preserved based on the category of subjects-of-a-life, making the latter a more inclusive category. It should be noted that although the lines of reasoning centered on sentience are often called "animalistic", they also have implications for the defense of broader landscape units that include vegetables, abiotic elements, etc.
This is true to the extent that, under natural conditions, wild sentient individuals would not be able to guarantee their interests but with the preservation of ecosystems which they are part of. Thus, these perspectives provide foundations for reflection on the treatment ethics human give both to domestic and wild animals.
The same does not occur with the holistic perspectives that focus their concern on landscape, "natural" or wild units, excluding from it the animals raised by humans. Rather, these issues have been raised in recent years by other types of subjects, such as traditional people and governments. Therefore, the objections to anthropocentrism that nowadays question the development patterns are not limited to seeking foundations in the Western philosophical tradition.
Effectively, reflections based on other philosophical perspectives have gained spaces in recent years, becoming, in some cases, programs to formulate alternative development paradigms to the prevalent models in the context of global capitalism. The Good Living and FIB approaches include the recognition of intrinsic moral value of nature, and in this sense, contain "Environmental Ethics".
At the same time, both express attempts to reposition their people in relation to the globalized capitalism, based on the recognition of their cultural specificities, and the valuation of such specificities by their ethical implications regarding nature. Thus, the interface between Environmental Ethics and reflection on development is complex, not only by the different lines of argument, but also by different types of individuals who use them, both in the academic field and outside it.
As it was said beforehand, the individualist perspectives focused on sentience allow analysis that cross the boundary between wild and domesticated environments, since the foundation of their moral consideration is the sentient beings, regardless of the degree of human intervention in their environments.
For Brazil, this feature proves particularly relevant, since the ethical challenges posed by the relationship with non-human beings are enormous, not only in relation to the transformation of wild landscapes, but also with respect to animals raised in artificially produced contexts. The latter are part of the process of radical transformation and manipulation of nature for the establishment of territorial development standards that now occupy a significant part of the Brazilian territory, with huge economic, environmental and ethical implications.
Related to the notion of sentience, moral disregard of sentient beings, depending on their species, is highly regarded by many authors as Speciesism, expression adopted by Singer in order to, by analogy with racism and sexism, qualify the practices that consider pain and suffering of sentient beings little relevant, based on their species. In the next section this category is exploited, aiming to demonstrate their critical and analytical capabilities for reflection on Sustainable Territorial Development in Brazil.
This category has fueled questions in various fields of social life, and the Australian philosopher Peter Singer is undoubtedly one of the most influential authors in this phenomenon. Singer is a contemporary author belonging to the utilitarian current which, as it is known, establishes a consequentialist ethic that prescribes maximizing the welfare of those affected by an action as a criterion to establish whether this action is ethically justifiable or not.
Singerdevelops the argument by which the circle of moral consideration, namely the extension of categories of beings with which humans have moral obligation, should be extended to the limit that includes all creatures which, according to our knowledge, are considered to be sentient, i.
The fact that these beings have the capacity to feel pain implies that they also have appreciation for their lives and a spontaneous tendency to seek satisfaction through what brings them welfare, and this implies, in turn, a sense of psychic or mental identity.
This is, therefore, the criterion advocated by Singer to establish the boundary of moral consideration: For him, "the capacity to suffer and feel pleasure, however, is not only necessarybut enough so that we can ensure that a being has interests - at least the interest not to suffer " Singer,p. According to the author, If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration.
No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that the suffering be counted equally with the like suffering - in so far as rough comparisons can be made - of any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others.
Singer,p. To avoid controversy with lawyers about the conditions that allow a certain quality to lead to the recognition of a right for example, the argument that the legal community is the product of a pact of reciprocity which animals cannot participateSinger chooses not to defend that sentient beings are bearers of rights, but of interests.
Once the basic normative criterion of any ethical action would be a tendency to maximize the welfare and prevent the generation of suffering, ethics cannot exclude beings who are sentient only because they do not belong to our species. Restricting moral consideration to our species would be Speciesism.
Anthropocentrism | philosophy | bestwebdirectory.info
From its inception, the Speciesism can be understood as a prejudice or a biased attitude in favor of the interests of members of the agent's own species and against the interests of members of other species. Singer does not propose a biocentric ethic that has any form of life as a criterion of moral consideration, a position for which he is criticized, not for the boldness of his position, but on the contrary, for the limits restricted to it.
Singer's attitude is deliberate, choosing arguments that are easily and intuitively understood, and to which one can give scientific support. It is frankly difficult to argue that causing suffering in a being which provenly feels pain is innocuous from an ethical point of view. Singer also chooses criteria which, in his view, would have undeniable practical feasibility if specific attitudes and policies were adopted, which would not be so obvious to other prospects that defend the intrinsic value of every life and every being.
For the author, there is a clear opportunity to consider alternatives to at least reduce the suffering inflicted on animals in the food industry, testings, etc. In other words, what sometimes is pointed out as limitation, in Singer's arguments it is also its own strengthiii. Second, by rejecting the Speciesism, Singer does not intend to propose a simplistic concept that denies the obvious differences between humans and animals as well, and he does not mean that the animals have the same rights as human beings.
Once the principle of equality between human "is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans" but "it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings" SINGER,p. These two elements help explain the magnitude of the impact caused by Singer's arguments giving support to animal rights movements.
It should be noted that Singer has also developed the application of his ideas to analyze more general environmental problems, involving wilderness areas and landscape units and therefore are not focused only on domestic animals.
This aspect of his work, however, has not been absorbed by the social movements with the same intensity, for reasons related to the concept of nature that prevails among the institutionalized actors of the environmental movement, brnging them closer to holistic arguments. Singer's main line, in this sense, is to make the account of sentience taken by the environmental protection field a justification for such concept.
This is argued by him from the recognition of the interests of wild animals that inhabit these areas, which provides an indirect argument for the protection of other forms of not sentient lifeiv. So, despite the speeches extolling Brazil's role in global food security and employment opportunities generated by the sector, it is noteworthy to detach the Speciesism category as a heuristic tool for the critical examination of these spatial development patterns.
Brazil's position climbing in the global meat market takes place in central countries especially Europe at the same time, public reflection on the ethical implications of meat production gains power and negative environmental externalities of activity becomes more obvious.
Inas part of monitoring and meeting the demands for animal welfare policies, the European Commission for Health and Consumer Protection ordered a special edition of the Eurobarometer in order to be aware of European consumers' views in relation to livestock treatment in Europe European Commission, The survey interviewed 24, people over 15 years in the 25 member states.
Respondents were asked about their opinion regarding the welfare of farmed animals, how the welfare of animals was considered in deciding the purchase of animal products, and what was the respondents' opinion on the policy developed by the European Community in relation to this issue.
But public reflection on livestock production in some major consuming centers results in paradoxical consequences for the producing regions, since the reflectivity on the consumption patterns of these centers favors the spatial segregation between consumer market and producer territory. Indeed, while in some large consumer centers certain activities become subject of questions and controversies, peripheral regions are willing to absorb this demand by building specialized territories.
These territories, whose spatial segregation protects them against the extra economic questions, encourage the free development of the methods of instrumental rationalization and increased productivity with fewer environmental restrictions and unhindered moral order. In this context, what we call here Intensive Speciesism Regions ISR arise, in which the process of building the territory is associated with intensive livestock industry, mediated by specific relationships among human beings.
These alleged vocations make these regions establish inter-regional specific relationships, both nationally and internationally, providing animal products to other areas and absorbing environmental liabilities and ethical burden. In them, the pattern of development is based on the premise, a false one, but ideologically reproduced in matching sentient beings to mere things, to the extent that the productive specialization requires those beings to be considered as raw materials of an industrial process.
These are regions with their own dynamics, where aspects of the modernization of production and Speciesism, which generally permeates social relations, appear in a particularly intense way, and whose naturalization results in a socio-political and economic process that takes place both in individuals' subjectivity and in the objective dimension of social life.
On the subjective side, it operates a symbolic reduction process in animality to a merely instrumental statute, based on mechanistic theological and philosophical as well as ethical anthropocentric justification, in contrast to the selective moralization of nature and life that characterizes the practices and cultural reflection of contemporaneity EDER, On the objective side, there is the political legitimation of economic models that enable, in an assistant mode, economic support for low-skilled industrial workers and farmers who find economic viability in the integration with agribusinesses.
This combination becomes a solid system as it relies on the "regional vocations" supposedly natural and self-evident, and tend to ignore other possibilities for production. These supposed vocations find their mainstay in social and political relations, linked to specific actors, beneficiaries of the conception of nature that the alleged vocation expresses. Among these actors are both economic groups such as large refrigeratorsand political sectors such as those competing in the state and local administrations and those that effectuate the political discourse with federal spheres.
The formation of these regions shows the enormous role of refrigerators and agroindustrial chains of meat production in the territory. In them, the Intensive Speciesism is associated with unhealthy and depressing working conditions for a large proportion of people in circumstances that are not usually seen in the official indicators.
The routine in slaughterhouses and abattoirs includes repetitive work on "animal disassembly lines"vi, in which there are frequent accidents, depression and trauma. In the ISR, the naturalization of dealing with animals, proper of traditional farming, is absorbed and reproduced without interruption, in an entirely different situation - the industrial productivism in scale economies.